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1. Introduction
One of the most important traits of John Dewey’s philosophy of new education
or his progressive educational ideology is that a learner is defined as an
individual capable of acquiring knowledge by means of an autonomously
conducted inquiry. Dewey insists that knowledge achieved in the learning
process should be embedded in social practices and a student’s experiences,
and be subject to criticism. This critical dimension requires educational
techniques to cultivate and foster – as Dewey puts it in his 1910 work entitled
How We Think – “effective habits of discriminating tested beliefs from mere
assertions, guesses, and opinions; to develop a lively, sincere, and open-
minded preference for conclusions that are properly grounded, and to ingrain
into the individual’s working habits methods of inquiry and reasoning
appropriate to the various problems that present themselves” (1910, pp. 27-
28).
The differentiation between “tested beliefs” and “mere opinions” is 
apparent in the light of the philosopher’s later works in which he focuses on 
logical, epistemological, and methodological issues. In Logic. Theory of Inquiry 
(1938) Dewey specifies the nature of scientific inquiry and opposes it to 
inquiry conducted with a common sense attitude. By stressing Dewey’s 
considerations on the nature of inquiry we shall expose the role of theoretical 
reflection in the habitual culture in which a learner participates. Finally, we 
shall ask about the degree to which the reflective reorganization of cognitive 
structures is interwoven with investigations which theoretically reformulate 
and redescribe the tissue of common sense beliefs. As we assume, learning 
appears to be a critical-theoretical process of revising habits based on already 
gathered experiences. 
2. Common Sense Culture
In his Theory of Valuation Dewey distinguishes three levels of the formation of
desire and interest: biological, psychological, and socio-cultural (1939, pp. 63–
64). However, as he states elsewhere, “in a cultural environment, physical
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conditions are modified by the complex of customs, traditions, occupations, 
interests and purposes which envelops them” (Dewey 1938, p. 60). Thus, 
human agency operates within a culturally constructed milieu. Also, human 
interests and desires originate from and are shaped by “cultural conditions 
and valuations” (Dewey 1939, p. 64) which stem from custom, institutions, 
and tradition. 
The most important thing here is that cultural reinterpretation of the 
physical surrounding “translates” needs, obstacles, and difficulties objectively 
found within the area of interactions between an organism and its 
environment into a subject of further conscious cognitive efforts. More 
precisely, the physical facts experienced by an organism are redefined in 
cultural terms which enable the individual to become capable of experiencing, 
defining, and resolving problems. The individual organism now becomes an 
inquirer; the initial situation of the experience of difficulty can now be 
improved through cognitive operations oriented at problem solution (1938, p. 
60). 
The possibility of a transition from difficulties experienced in practical 
life to a methodical inquiry is guaranteed by a culture which translates 
biological needs into cultural and social issues invested with linguistic 
meanings and instituted norms and rules. Thus, to explain this transition, we 
shall detail two fundamental characteristics of Dewey’s understanding of 
“culture” as (1) a reservoir of linguistic meanings and (2) a normative and 
regulative factor of human conduct. 
Firstly, culture provides a conceptual framework for categorizing and 
identifying experienced phenomena. As Dewey puts it, the cultural matrix 
“supplies, through the medium of language, means for explicit formulation of 
kinds but also extends vastly the variety and number of kinds” (1938, p. 265). 
Secondly, culture consists of action rules in a broad sense of the term. “Culture 
institutes and consists of a vast number of ways of dealing with things. 
Moreover, certain ways of action are formulated as standard and normative 
rules of action and of judgment on the part of members of the cultural group” 
(Dewey 1938, p. 265). In analogy to the way in which it suggests the ways for 
dealing with the environment, culture guides an actor in his interactions with 
social environment: “persons are sorted out into distinctive kinds on the 
ground of allowable and prohibited modes of acting toward and with them” 
(1938, p. 265). 
Taking into consideration especially its second role of a normative and 
regulative factor of human conduct, culture may be defined as “common 
sense” knowledge since such knowledge 
consists in its generalized phase, of a body of such standardized 
conceptions which are regulative (or are rules) of the actions and 
beliefs of persons as to what is proper and improper, required, 
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permitted and forbidden in respect to the objects of the physical 
and social environment (Dewey 1938, p. 265). 
The valuational essence of common sense penetrates the entire 
environment, both social and physical, furnishing it with axiological 
qualifications. As far as actors engage in practical activities in order to satisfy 
their needs and desires or to achieve their objectives, the world appears to be 
adequately described in terms prompted by common sense. In consequence, 
the conceptual framework developed within the common sense of a culture 
becomes the most “natural”, i.e. self-evident and apparent, explication of social 
understanding of the world. 
The concept of “common sense” itself – as a fundamental philosophical 
category – was introduced and elaborated in the 18th century in the Scottish 
school of common sense. According to Christopher Hookway, Thomas Reid – 
one of the originators of the school – understood “common sense as a body of 
ill-defined but self-evident and certain principles which guide our actions and 
our beliefs, including our philosophical ones” (Hookway 2002, p. 198). The 
above-mentioned “body of principles” was intended to guide reflection as a 
criterion of testing the validity of propositions formulated in philosophical 
theories. Due to the primacy of common sense, if a given philosophical 
theorem contradicted common sense beliefs, the philosopher was supposed to 
give it up exactly because of its inconsistency with an opinion widely accepted 
in a given social setting or even characteristic of entire mankind. Dewey 
argues, however, that Reid’s standpoint merely exposes the aspects of 
generality, self-evidence, and unquestionability of common sense beliefs while 
putting aside the issue of the impact of common sense on cultural and life-
related activities. Instead, Dewey (1938) focuses on the “regulative” and 
“normative” traits of common sense beliefs which make up 
a commonplace that every cultural group possesses, a set of  
meanings which are so deeply embedded in its customs, 
occupations, traditions and ways of interpreting its physical 
environment and group-life, that they form the basic categories of 
the language-system by which details are interpreted (Dewey 
1938, p. 62). 
Indeed, in the course of everyday practice members of cultural communities 
guide their conduct by common sense beliefs. In most cases common sense 
beliefs exhibit self-evidence and confirm their effectiveness. Nevertheless, it 
does not imply that they are not sensitive to criticism and irrefutable. As we 
will try to show, the unquestionability of common sense beliefs, as it is 
presupposed by Reid, is at most a cultural fact, a situation inherited from 
earlier generations, a result of longstanding practice of a given community. For 
philosophy of education it means that education ought to provide tools for 
critical reflection on common sense knowledge. 
Anna Malitowska & Mateusz Bonecki 
 
187 
 
According to Hookway (2002, pp. 205–211) the route of critical 
reconsideration of common sense has been initiated by the originator of 
classical American pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce, in his conception of “critical 
common-sensism.” Peirce’s point is that in the case of inquiry every 
proposition to which we ascribe certainty should be first put into doubt by 
means of experience, imagination, and thought experiments. Only 
withstanding such a critical analysis provides the statement in question with 
validity which itself never becomes unquestionable and remains open for 
further inquiry-based criticism. 
 The issue raised within critical common-sensism also applies to habits 
which embody the cultural understanding of the world. Dewey is aware of the 
fact that “the standardized conceptions and rules are for the most part 
products of habit and tradition” (1938, p. 265). At the same time that is the 
reason why those “conceptions” of conduct “are so fixed that they are not 
themselves open to question or criticism” (Dewey 1938, p. 265). 
3. From Common Sense to Scientific Inquiry 
The acquisition of common sense beliefs and the formation of corresponding 
habits are a part of enculturation and socialization processes. As a result, each 
culturally educated actor perceives his environment as culturally shaped: the 
surrounding is understood in terms of cultural linguistic meanings and in the 
scope of significance it holds in the eyes of a cultural group as a whole. Dewey 
addresses such a linguistic system as “common” or “ordinary language.” 
The meanings involved in this common language system determine 
what individuals of the group may and may not do in relation to physical 
objects and in relations to one another. They regulate what can be used and 
enjoyed and how use and enjoyment shall occur (Dewey 1938, p. 115). 
The meanings of such a language system organize social experience. 
They function as a conceptual scheme constituted by interests and 
occupations; they are maintained within everyday communication and guide 
both individual and group conduct. According to Dewey, thinking involved in 
practical operations is a form of concrete thinking. In his words: “when 
thinking is used as a means to some end, good, or value beyond itself, it is 
concrete” (Dewey 1910, p. 138). In a more generalized form Dewey’s 
statement could be formulated as follows: 
Conception A is concrete if, and only if, the acceptance of 
conception A leads to an immediate practical operation. 
The origin of such an understanding of concreteness of thinking and related 
concepts may be traced back to Charles S. Peirce and his theory of pragmatic 
meaning. According to Peirce, semiosis, that is the process of continuous sign 
transformation, finally leads (or at least is supposed to lead) to a stage when a 
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given sign is interpreted by practical actions and practical involvement in the 
surrounding world. In his popular essay How to Make Our Ideas Clear (1878) 
Peirce introduced the idea of a “pragmatic maxim” which openly states that 
comprehensive understanding of signs requires the interpreter or inquirer to 
grasp the pragmatic meaning, i.e. the meaning defined in terms of practical 
consequences following from the acceptance of a sign. In his 1903 Harvard 
Lectures on Pragmatism Peirce points to action-imperatives as a final and 
pragmatic form to which every meaningful construction of signs should be 
unfolded. He states that the essence of the entire pragmatism idea consists 
in the 
principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a 
sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought 
whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a 
corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional 
sentence having its apodosis in the imperative mood (Peirce 
1998, pp. 134-135). 
Whichever body of theoretical and abstract knowledge we shall analyze, as far 
as it is considered to be empirical, it is supposed to imply observational – 
which for Peirce always means “practical” – consequences. 
Thus, Dewey’s “concrete conceptions” employed in concrete thinking 
processes apply to means, ends, and observable or practically controllable 
circumstances of human conduct. A vast part of common sense beliefs – since 
they express the socially shared vision of the surrounding world in which 
human conduct takes place – can be and usually is expressed only with the use 
of concrete terms. However, the conceptual framework of concrete thinking 
affects the nature of reasoning proper to practical inquiries primarily oriented 
at conduct and procedure rearrangement. 
Because common sense problems and inquiries have to do with 
the interactions into which living creatures enter in connection 
with environing conditions in order to establish objects of use 
and enjoyment, the symbols employed are those which have been 
determined in the habitual culture of a group (Dewey 1938, p. 
115). 
In his study on inquiry in educational settings Johnston (2009, 46) notices that 
defining problems, in the very first place, in moral terms and categories, in 
order to create a situation of decision, automatically prevents an actor-
inquirer from making a due and careful diagnosis of the relations which are 
constitutive for his situation. In consequence, the knowledge resources for the 
decision process are – presumably – insufficient. At least, the actor cannot 
ascertain that he managed to provide the best diagnosis and knowledge 
possible at the moment. Dewey is convinced that even partial disengagement 
from practical occupation is a key factor in the improvement of the quality of 
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practice: “exclusive preoccupation with matters of use and application so 
narrows the horizon as in the long run to defeat itself” (Dewey 1910, p. 139). 
A conceptual framework determined by practical life requirements is 
narrow in that it usually precludes identification of new phenomena and new 
relations between them. An inquirer may experience a magnitude of isolated 
facts that he is unable to connect. Dewey suggests that a counterweight to this 
helplessness of common sense is the procedure elaborated within the 
methodology of modern science. To illustrate the innovative way in which 
modern science deals with the world, Dewey gives the following example: the 
conception of water as H2O has revealed a multitude of relations of this 
chemical substance – not only as an object of practical use and enjoyment – 
including hitherto unknown relations with phenomena which have been 
known for centuries (Dewey 1939, pp. 59-60). However, it would not have 
been possible at all had modern science not presupposed both a different 
conceptual framework and a theoretically constituted perspective. It is only 
thanks to that achievement that an inquirer is able to make innovative 
inferences, predictions, and to test those predictions empirically. 
That is the main reason why Dewey distinguishes between scientific 
and common sense inquiry. The former is oriented directly at practical 
problems and behavior adjustments; its goal is the settlement of the problems 
of action and use. Scientific inquiry, on the other hand, does not produce direct 
practical instructions and focuses on establishing connections between 
phenomena, regardless of their instant impact on actual practical issues. 
Although in both modes of inquiry the product is knowledge, the difference is 
that common sense knowledge is formulated so that it could provide content 
for concrete thinking leading to immediate practical conduct. Accordingly, 
Dewey (1938, p. 60) defines the “world” or “common sense environment” as 
an environment in which people are directly involved and engaged. Common 
sense inquiry is from now on understood as an inquiry which aims at “making 
the required adjustments in behavior.”  
Only later does Dewey detail his understanding of scientific inquiry in 
which “there is no direct involvement of human beings in the immediate 
environment” (1938, p. 61). He states that a scientific procedure is not 
supposed to “accept what was given and established in common sense” (1938, 
p. 96). Science is capable of recognizing relations between phenomena which 
common sense knowledge is not able to grasp; it is “no longer an organization 
of meanings and modes of action that have their presence in the meanings and 
syntactical structures of ordinary language” (Dewey 1938, p. 97). Inquiries 
conducted within common sense and within scientific inquiry differ with 
respect to their levels of theoreticity. The range of problems to be resolved, put, 
or transformed on the basis of common sense knowledge and its conceptual 
framework is limited. It can be extended by the conceptual framework of 
scientific inquiry and the knowledge formulated on its basis. According to 
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Johnston, “scientific inquiry operates largely at the level of abstract reasoning 
and ideas: common sense operates at the level of the concrete” (2009, p. 22). 
The extension of the scope of scientific inquiry – as Dewey (1938, p. 97) 
argues – is possible because of what he calls a “reflective organization” of 
common sense which means (i) articulation of hidden implications of common 
sense beliefs; (ii) an extension of the conceptual framework due to an 
investigation of issues reaching beyond the area of common sense interest; 
and (iii) production of an arrangement and order of phenomena with which 
common sense is unfamiliar. 
Usually, practical problems are diagnosed and eventually resolved by 
means of common sense inquiry. In case of a cognitive failure the thinking 
process leads to further thinking processes, and so it triggers a rather 
speculative and theoretical form of inquiry. Regardless of which mode of 
inquiry is at stake, in each case the process of inquiry gives rise to a body of 
knowledge formulated in terms of a relevant conceptual framework; the 
practical world and the scientific image of the world are now subjects of, 
respectively, common sense knowledge (KC) or scientific knowledge (KS), as 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Common sense knowledge KC and scientific knowledge KS as the results of two modes of 
inquiry conducted within their respective conceptual frameworks 
 
In the scientific approach the practical world (experienced and organized 
through a conceptual framework characteristic for ordinary language) turns 
out to be only a part of a larger and more complex scientific image in the sense 
of a complex relational structure. That structure remains unknown for the 
practical perspective based on common-sense. Hence, theories constructed in 
the scientific approach allow for questions, problems, and solutions unattainable 
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for common sense inquiry. The scientific image of the world entails regularities 
and relations impenetrable from the perspective of the common sense body of 
knowledge KC; regularities and laws discoverable within common sense 
knowledge make but a sub-range of the complex relational structure 
accessible from within the scientific image. It means that both systems differ 
with regard to their so-called predictive and explanatory power. This 
difference could be interpreted as follows: 
the predictive and explanatory power of system of knowledge KS 
exceeds the predictive and explanatory power of cultural system 
KC. 
In other words, KS provides a more comprehensive understanding of the 
environing world than KC. When common sense fails to answer certain 
questions, like Why did this incident happen? or What will happen if such and 
such circumstances occur? it is more probable that scientific knowledge will 
settle such questions and indirectly improve human practice by providing it 
with an innovative theory of reality. 
However, the theoretical or reflective organization characteristic of 
scientific inquiry does not only take place in natural sciences. For instance, 
Dewey claims that in the field of social sciences and normative disciplines 
scholars should reconstruct historically given systems of valuations; 
conclusions drawn from such cultural-anthropological knowledge of past 
valuations would enable a more extensive prediction of “probable 
consequences” (1939, p. 58) of human conduct. As it has been discussed 
elsewhere (Malitowska 2012), in contemporary philosophy of education the 
pragmatic conception of scientific inquiry has undergone a “philosophical 
transposition” and, as such, it plays an important role as a pedagogical method 
facilitating the development of critical thinking. 
4. Informal Education As a Subject to Inquiry 
Dewey’s account of “informal education” differs from what contemporary 
education theorists understand under the term. In Dewey’s view the emphasis 
falls on general processes of socialization and enculturation rather than on 
detailed activities like learning in the workplace, learning in informal 
circumstances such as a museum visit, or acquiring knowledge by using media 
or consuming popular culture. For Dewey, “informal education” becomes 
synonymous with entering social life. 
Social life is a vivid source of educational content: it constitutes a 
framework within which specialist knowledge and skills gain their social 
importance, role, and meaning. Informal education takes place as an individual 
participates in commonly undertaken actions, communicates, and interacts 
with others. Thus, informal education is understood as a process of 
socialization and enculturation which provides children and adolescents with 
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knowledge, skills, and attitudes that constitute the very core of social life; it is 
“education which everyone gets from living with others” (Dewey 1916, p. 7). In 
earlier historical forms of social life all pertinent knowledge was put into 
practice, so the basic condition of acquiring all relevant knowledge was to 
participate in social life and, along with others, to practically deal with 
practical world issues. The so-called real life experience and educational 
process fell into one. 
However, the situation changes as the division of labor and the 
structure of life become more and more complex, leading to far-reaching 
specialization and stratification of competences across cultural groups. This is 
why Dewey calls for constant reflection over the correspondence between the 
processes of informal and formal education: “There is the standing danger that 
the material of formal instruction will be merely the subject matter of the 
schools, isolated from the subject matter of life-experience” (Dewey 1916, p. 
10). 
Fishman and McCarthy argue that a Deweyan educator has to maintain 
a continuous balance between the level of a learner’s interest in the subject 
matter and the comprehensibility of the content being learned, between 
challenges and “being at home”, between the senses of unfamiliarity and 
familiarity. Thus, the efficiency of educational efforts is warranted by a 
continuous and adequate interplay of educational goals, explicit learning 
content, and “bridges” linking the student’s past and future experiences 
(Fishman & McCarthy 1998, p. 37–39). 
Since the process of informal education is functional in that it 
guarantees “continuity”, Dewey tries to adopt its basic traits on the ground of 
formal education. Therefore, the latter has to emulate the social dimension of 
learning. In order to achieve that goal Dewey starts from the assumption that 
efficient assimilation of new content by a learner is possible due to its 
correspondence with the learner’s previous experiences. Didactical material 
should link with possible problem situations the student can encounter and 
with prior systems of experience. At this point, Dewey (appeals to the 
psychological principle of apperception which states “that we assimilate new 
material with what we have digested and retained from prior experiences”. In 
consequence, when considered in school settings, “the ‘apperceptive basis’ of 
material furnished by teacher and text-book should be found, as far as 
possible, in what the learner has derived from more direct forms of his own 
experience” (1910, p. 199). The correspondence with the “apperceptive basis” 
both facilitates the learning and introduces elements of social experience 
(present in previous experiences of the student) into the content of formal 
education. 
Secondly, Dewey explains the role that acquired knowledge and 
competences play in social life. To set apart from purely “bookish” knowledge, 
Dewey draws the distinction between information and wisdom. 
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Information is knowledge which is merely acquired and stored 
up; wisdom is knowledge operating in the direction of powers to 
the better living of life. Information, merely as information, 
implies no special training of intellectual capacity; wisdom is the 
finest fruit of that training (Dewey 1910, p. 51). 
Thus, wisdom, understood as actionable information, presupposes that a 
student knows when, how, and for what purpose a given portion of knowledge 
and competences, may be applied; moreover, a wise learner is also expected to 
ask about the value-character of both the ends and the means which underlie 
conduct. The interplay between informal and formal education strives to 
“avoid a split between what men consciously know because they are aware of 
having learned it by a specific job of learning, and what they unconsciously 
know because they have absorbed it in the formation of their characters by 
intercourse with others” (1916, pp. 10-11). 
When considered within institutional schooling practices, “informal 
education” reproduces certain aspects of social practice in which formally 
taught knowledge and skills are to be ultimately immersed. Informal education 
is supposed to furnish acquired competence with social meaning and 
relevance. Education, as it provides a student with knowledge as actionable 
information, prepares him to cooperate and communicate with others and to 
contribute to the social practice and cultural community in which the 
individual participates. 
The teacher assumes a portion of knowledge to be assimilated by 
students pre-reflectively: they gain competence although they are not aware of 
that fact; all they acquire is knowing-how rather than knowing-that (Ryle 
1949). For instance, when a group in a classroom respectfully and peacefully 
discusses an exemplary moral dilemma, the mutual respect and inclusive 
character of the discussion themselves do not become an explicit topic of the 
lesson. Although they are not thematized at this particular moment, the 
student gets acquainted with them as presupposed and crucial conditions of 
every democratic discussion. The educational process realized within such a 
discussion practice forms the necessary habits significant from the perspective 
of modern democratic societies. However, as education touches on more 
complex issues, students get acquainted with more abstract topics like 
democracy, human dignity, or discourse ethics principles; and it means that 
informally acquired habits become issues of explicit, formal education. 
Still, the informal aspect of education enables a teacher or an 
instructor to use exactly the same methods and techniques which warrant the 
effectiveness of socialization processes: direct communication, face-to-face 
relations, social intercourses, or learning by example or through imitation. 
When employed in the classroom, they all create situations in which a student 
spontaneously acquires socially desirable attitudes and habits. From a 
student’s perspective, the social and informal context does not become 
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problematic as he acquires new skills and knowledge. The learner is placed in 
conditions enforced, so to speak, by the teacher who bears in mind their social 
importance. Common sense rules and beliefs are reproduced in the body of the 
learner’s habits. Hence, the informal education incorporated in the classroom 
activities: 
i. assumes that the subject matter implicit in education is not 
problematic (i.e. the informally taught subject matter is not put into 
doubt and critically reconsidered by the learner himself); 
ii. is realizable only by means of practice, imitation, socialization, 
personal contact, examples; 
iii. forms habits and transmits common-sensual beliefs constitutive for 
the social status quo; 
iv. contains no theoretical content which could (eventually) function as a 
referential framework for further evaluation of common-sensual 
knowledge resources inherited from a culture; 
v. elucidates social significance of knowledge and competences as it 
introduces the role of tasks and processes realized with given 
(formally transferred) competences in the totality of social life and 
institutions; 
vi. enables the learner, as it is complementary to formal education, to 
bridge the gap between actual social experience and the material to be 
mastered by means of formal education. 
 
At this point the question arises whether such a construction of educational 
environment for the sake of informal education does not simply reduce the 
teaching process to a transmission of knowledge which strays from the 
progressive ideal of open-mindedness and problem-solving procedures. 
Kohlberg and Mayer (1972, p. 460) state that Dewey was far from identifying 
the fundamental goal of education with a mere transfer of beliefs and attitudes 
expected and required by the current status quo of the society, as was the case 
in the educational ideology of Burrhus F. Skinner and his followers within the 
behavioristic psychology. Dewey, indeed, goes beyond the above-mentioned 
program of “cultural transmission” because of two fundamental reasons. 
Firstly, the learning prepares students to solve problems the society 
could be, at least at the moment, unaware of, and for occupations that have not 
even been discovered yet. Education is perceived here within the constructivist 
approach as a process of development of cognitive structures consisting of beliefs 
and conceptual frameworks which enable an individual to adapt to or to modify 
environing conditions. And, since those conditions are reinterpreted in cultural 
terms, the main task of education is the development of cognitive competence 
for both common sense and scientific inquiry. According to the study of 
Kohlberg and Mayer, Dewey represents the position of progressive educational 
ideology which “equates knowledge with neither inner experience nor outer 
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sense-reality, but with an equilibrated or resolved relationship between an 
inquiring human actor and a problematic situation” (1972, p. 460). 
Secondly, education is considered to be a long-run developmental 
process in which the initially informal content of education is constantly 
thematized and explicitly placed within the scope of formal and intentional 
education. The background of social life and experience (i.e. common sense 
beliefs) becomes the explicit subject matter of a lesson and, as such, is also 
subject to inquiry. As students proceed to more complex issues elaborated in 
abstract terms, inquiry stops relying on common sense resources and evolves 
into a more scientific procedure of an experimental method. In other words, as 
the learner proceeds with the reflective reorganization of common sense 
knowledge, he critically and theoretically analyzes the previous content of 
informal education. It means that the learner improves and reorganizes social 
practices and experiences, and reflectively revises inherited common sense 
knowledge (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Informal education content as a subject of inquiry. 
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and custom, to faith in progress through the intelligent regulation of existing 
conditions” (Dewey 1910, p. 154). 
Richard Rorty (1982) once gave the opinion that early stages of 
education realize the aim of socialization and only later, as the student 
proceeds on the learning path and experiences more and more complex social 
and natural phenomena, the education changes its course and focuses on the 
development of a critical attitude toward reality. In fact, he referred to Dewey 
who holds that the fundamental task of the philosophy of education is to 
guarantee a balance between informal and formal education, between 
socialization background and explicit knowledge transfer which leads to a 
subsequent critical approach to inherited culture and its pertinent common-
sensual knowledge resources. 
5. Conclusion 
The above considerations follow Dewey’s view that informal education is a 
product of social practices and intercourses. Interpreted in terms of 
socialization, informal education is a form of consolidation of what the 
community knows and is able to do on the basis of shared common sense 
beliefs. The latter appear to be the ultimate, most elementary, and usually self-
evident guidance into the world of social and cultural life. But it is exactly 
those usually self-evident and well-established rules that veil alternative 
modes of conduct and problem resolutions. 
 This is why education is supposed to keep the balance between formal 
and informal transfer of knowledge, skills, and attitudes, and to employ such 
procedures of inquiry as proceed from concrete practical occupations, through 
the cognitive operations of generalization and abstraction, to speculation and 
theorizing. Only by doing so the habitual culture of a group could be subjected 
to critical scientific inquiry. It allows for a better understanding of habitual 
practices of a community and, presumably, opens up an opportunity to put 
them into doubt, approach them critically, and ask questions whether and how 
the common sense beliefs could be improved. As Dewey once stated: “Interest 
in knowledge for the sake of knowledge, in thinking for the sake of the free 
play of thought, is necessary then to the emancipation of practical life to make 
it rich and progressive” (1910, p. 139). 
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Abstract. This paper focuses on analysis of relation between pedagogical and 
epistemological ideas of John Dewey. Our considerations are divided into four 
sections. (1) We reconstruct Dewey’s conception of culture as a body 
of normative and regulative common sense beliefs determining human 
conduct and language use. (2) Further, we compare common sense based 
inquiry and its scientific mode with regard to their respective conceptual 
frameworks in order to show that “theoretical-scientific” perspective 
provides more comprehensive insight into the relations constituting 
problem situations. (3) We identify informal education with socialization 
processes and argue that educational process relies on constant reflection 
on cultural habits. (4) We conclude that competences of using theoretical 
conceptual frameworks and conducting scientific inquiry play crucial role in 
Dewey’s educational ideology of progressivism since they provide basic tools 
for critical reconsideration and revision of common sense beliefs. 
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